Introduction. A classic method of conceptual definition per genus et differentiam
(by specifying genus and species differences) is very common in modern social sciences and humanities, including jurisprudence. This method and a philosophical theory associated with it has become an object of discussion and criticism by Herbert L.A. Hart (1907 Hart ( -1992 formulating an idea of "performatives" as speech acts opposed to simple descriptions ("constatives") (Austin, 1961) .
Hart applies ideas of diversity of speech functions to the so-called "social" concepts, primarily to concepts (terms) of legal language, such as "contract", "crime", "property", "action", "state", "corporation", "right", "duty", etc. (Hart, 1949; 1983a; 1955; 1957) . According to the philosopher, in contrast to "natural" classes conclusions" (qualification of a particular case) (Hart, 1949; 1983a, s. II-III; etc.) . In other words in his initial (1953) where it doesn't exist) (Hart, 1949; 1983a, s. II-III) . In contrast to that in his 1950s works 2) A statement of the form "X has a right" is used for drawing a legal conclusion in a particular case which falls under relevant rules (Hart, 1983a: 35) .
Another typical instance is Hart's definition of a concept "legal person" ("corporation") with an example concerning the name of a fictional state "Nusquamia". According to the author, "to elucidate it we must… take the whole statement 'Nusquamia owes you £1000' and describe its use perhaps as follows:
1. Here in the territory of Nusquamia there is a legal system in force; under the laws of this system certain persons on complying with certain conditions are authorized for certain purposes to receive sums of money and to do other actions analogous to those required to make a contract of loan between private individuals.
2. When such persons do such acts certain consequences, analogous to those attached to the similar actions of private individuals, follow, including the liability of persons defined by law to repay the sums of money out of funds defined by law.
3. The expression 'Nusquamia owes you £1000' does not state the existence of these rules nor of these circumstances, but is true in a particular case when they exist, and is used in drawing a conclusion of law from these rules in a particular case" (Hart, 1983a: 38-39) .
In regard to Hart's proclaimed method of definition it's necessary to pay attention to a number of points.
First, relatively brief "definitions" cited here are ones among few quite well-composed, compact and structured "philosophical definitions" presented in the author's texts. In
Hart's other writings there are either much more lengthy explanations of legal concepts (e.g., a concept of legal obligation (Hart, 1957: 965-967) or even a concept of law (Hart, 1994) As for a jurisprudential aspect, Hart, first, focuses on "philosophical" rather than "technical" definitions, i.e. on explanation of specific nature of legal concepts, their meaning, relations to norms and facts, their speech functions, etc., and not on fixation of correct use of relevant terms within a legal system, their place in existing classifications (Hart, 1955, s. II; 1957, s. IIIa, IIId) .
Hence Hart's analytical jurisprudence converted along the model of philosophical-linguistic studies à lа J.L. Austin and others, separates itself from discussing a number of traditional problems of (general and branch) legal dogma and practice (Bodenheimer, 1956) .
Second, Hart's methodology provides an analytical and value-neutral description / explanation of basic legal concepts, centering its typical, "clear" cases of language usage (Hart, 1955, s. V; 1957, s. IIIa) . As a consequence, this approach doesn't offer doctrinal justification of legal decisions, including one in situations of uncertainty (Dworkin, 1977) ; value assessment of normative systems and substantiation of an obligation to follow legal rules, especially in relation to vicious political regimes and immoral official regulations (Fuller, 1958) ; empirical formalization and verification of its theoretical claims (Leiter, 2003) .
Nevertheless, it should be noted that similar Austin, 1961; 1962) . 
